The Logical Analysis of the Concept of a Right in Terms of Legal Meta-Sentences
This paper analyzes the concept of rights from a logical point of view. We start on two types of legal sentences: legal object sentences and legal meta-sentences. A legal object sentence describes an obligation of its addressee and a legal meta-sentence describes the validity of a legal sentence. We consider a legal sentence one that describes someone’s right as a legal meta-sentence. We clarify logically how legal meta-sentences regulating rights work to establish the validity of legal object sentences in legal reasoning on a concrete legal case.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The concepts of legal sentences
- 2.1. Legal rule and fact sentences
- 2.2. Legal object and meta-sentences
- 3. Fundamental legal meta-sentences
- 3.1. The most fundamental meta-rule sentence
- 3.2. Fundamental meta-rule sentences regulating the relation between rights and duties
- 4. Case problem
- 5. Analysis of changes of legal rights and duties relations
- 5.1. Phases of the change of the validity of legal sentences through the exercise of rights
- 5.2. The occurrence of the obligation to repair the goods
- 6. Implementation of the reasoning of the relationship between rights and duties
- 6.1. CPF as a logical representation method of legal knowledge
- 6.2. Representations of fundamental legal meta-rule sentences
- 6.3. Meta-inference engine
- 6.4. Demonstration of inferring an obligation from the exercise of a right
- 7. Conclusion
- 8. Acknowledgements
- 9. References
Loggen Sie sich bitte ein, um den ganzen Text zu lesen.
Es gibt noch keine Kommentare
Ihr Kommentar zu diesem Beitrag
AbonnentInnen dieser Zeitschrift können sich an der Diskussion beteiligen. Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Kommentare verfassen zu können.
0 Kommentare